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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
SELMAR RAY PURCELL, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 16783 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, SELMAR RAY PURCELL, appeal from a jury 
verdict of guilty of escape in the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah the Honorable Dean 
E. Conder, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty of escape and sentenced 
to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for the term provided 
for by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and 
judgment and an order directing the case to be remanded to the 
Third Judicial District Court with directions to have a new 
trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 24, 1979 the appellant and two other inmates 
walked away from the Utah State Prison (T.95, 114-117) all three 
inmates were apprehended within hours in the Granger area of 
Salt Lake County (T.123). About a month prior to this incident 
the appellate had been attacked by several other prisoners 
and had received a number of stab wounds in his back and 
chest area and his legs (T.193, 208-209, 222, 248-9). Although 
the appellant did not officially report the incident for fear of 
reprisals by the inmates he did report it to M..r. Chavez, one 
of the counselors at the Utah State Prison. (T .124-5) In addition 
the appellant asked to be removed from the section of the prison 
where the attack took place (T.233). At the time of the trial 
the appellant and other witnesses testified that he was continuously: 
afraid for his life after the stabbing incident (T. 184, 226-7). 
The appellant further testified that having failed to be 
transferred on request and being afraid that if he officially 
reported the attack he would suffer reprisals, it was his 
intention to attempt an escape so that he would be transferred to 
the maximum security block which is the usual penalty for 
attempted escape (T.227-8, 241). The appellant testified that 
it was his intention from the beginning that after making good 
his escape he would then turn himself in to the authorities 
(T.264). During the course of the trial the appellant requested 
a continuance to compel the attendance of Mr. Chavez who had been 
subpoenaed but failed to appear r~ ?~~-'' Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only defense witness that was an official at the Utah State 
Prison with direct knowledge of the stabbing of the defendant 
(T.224-5). The trial judge ruled that such testimony would 
only be cumulative and refused to grant the continuance 
(T.275). At the close of the trial the judge refused all of 
the appellant's requested jury instructions on compulsion 
and verbally instructed the jury from the bench as follows: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, I propose to 
submit this to you_for your determination. Before 
I do, however, I'm going to strike the testimony 
that has been received here in Court about any 
threats or coercion upon the defendants causing 
them if they did decide to leave the prison, 
that testimony I don't think is applicable to the 
case. And you are admonished to disregard it ... 
(T. 268) 
The appellate took proper exception to the refused 
instruction (T. 274). 
During the second day of trial at the end of the after-
noon recess the court on its own motion cleared the courtroom 
of all spectators, locked the courtroom doors and placed two 
extra sheriff's deputies inside the courtroom (T.244-245). A 
motion for a mistrial was made and joined in by all the parties 
on the grounds that the closing of the courtroom denied the 
appellant the right to a public trial as guaranteed by the con-
stitution of the United States and the State of Utah. (T.257). 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON COMPULSION AS REQUESTED BY THE APPELLATE 
AND COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF A WITNESS FOR 
CORROBORATION. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) provides: 
Compulsion - (1) A person is not guilty of an offense 
-3-
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when he engaged in the proscribed conduct because 
he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened 
imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him 
or a third person, which force or threatened force 
a person of reasonable firmness in his situtaion 
would not have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this 
section shall be unavailable to a person who 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places 
himself in a situation in which it is probable that 
he will be subjected to duress. 
At the trial the appellant testified that he was compelled 
to leave the prison because he was in fear for his life. 
This contention would have been corroborated by Mr. Chavez, 
an employee at the Utah State Prison, but Mr. Chavez failed 
to appear when subpoened and the trial court refused to allow 
time to compel his attendance. The trial court's exclusion 
of the only non-prisoner witness for the defense Mr. Chavez 
seriously compromised the corroboration of the defendant's 
case. The right to present all competent evidence in his 
behalf is inherent in the Due Process guarantees of a fair 
trial. In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 92 L.Ed 2d 682, 68 S.Ct. 
499 (1948) . 
In the case of United States v. Bailey, U.S. 
62 L.Ed. 575, 100 S.Ct. (Jan 21, 1980) the United States 
has considered the defense of compulsion in escape cases. In the 
Baily case the Supreme Court recognized the defense of compul-
sion provided it is demonstrated that the only reasonab}e 
alternative was to escape and that a bona fide effort to sur-
render or return to custody is made. Even though the Supreme 
Court recognized the defense of compulsion in an escape case the 
Instruction on compulsion was not appropriate because the 
defendant was out of custody a month or more and there was no 
-4-
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evidence of any intent to return. In the present case the 
defendant was recaptured within a short period following his 
escape and he testified in court that he intended to turn 
himself back into the prison authorities in order to receive 
a different custodial treatment at the prison. 
In the case of United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 
543 (10th Circuit-1978) the defendant was tried and convicted 
in the federal court for attempted escape. The defendant 
admitted his attempted escape but contended that he was 
coerced into leaving the prison from a long history of abuse 
and mistreatment at the hands of both the prison officials and 
fellow inmates. The 10th Circuit affirmed the conviction holding 
that the trial court properly instructed the jury and that the 
defense of coercion did not excuse escape unless there was no 
time for a complaint to be made or unless such a complaint would 
have been futile. The court also held that the prisoner must 
have intended to report innnediately to the proper authorities 
upon obtaining a position of safety. New Mexico in a recent 
Supreme Court decision recognized the defense of compulsion 
in a fact situation very similar to those presented in the 
instant case. Esquibel v. State, 576 P.2d 1129 (N.M. 1978). The 
New Mexico Supreme Court, noting that duress or compulsion is 
historically a widely recognized defense to escape stated: 
Defendant successfully raises the defense of duress 
when he presents evidence . . . from which a jury 
can conclude that he feared inunediate great bodily 
harm to himself or another person if he did not 
commit the crime charged and that a reasonable 
person would have acted in the same way under the 
circumstances. The defendant thus having 
established a prima facia case of duress (compulsion), 
the burden then shifts to the State to prove beyond 
-5-
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a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act 
under such reasonable fear, 576 P.2d at 1132. 
The E"squihel court held that in view of a prolonged history 
of beatings and serious threatsl the most recent having occured 
48 to 72 hours before the escape, the defendant was entitled 
to an instruction on duress~ The compulsion in the instant 
case was at least as serious as in the Esquibel case since 
Purcell had received a number of stab wounds .. 
In the case of State v. Horn, 566 P.2d 1378 
(Hawaii 1977); the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed a lower court 
conviction for not instructing the jury on the question of 
compulsion. The defense offered evidence of a history of 
violence among the prisoners and a refusal or inability of 
prison officials to guarantee security and safety in a particular 
cell block. The Supreme Court in the Horn case held that if 
competent evidence going to the defense of compulsion was 
presented then the jury should have been instructed on that 
question. 
In a Florida case the Supreme Court reversed a lower 
court for its failure to permit the defendant to establish a 
defense where he contended that he escaped to avoid sexual 
advances and threats of sexual battery. Lewis v. State, 318 
S. 2d 529 (Florida 1975). The Supreme Court in the Lewis case 
stated that if the defendants proffered evidence were true he 
would have a valid defense insofar as it might establish a 
lack of willful intent to avoid lawful confinement or at least 
create a reasonable doubt. The defendant claimed he escaped for 
the purpose of reporting the threats to the circuit judge. 
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The Lewis case is directly in point with the instant case in 
that Purcell testified that he escaped for the purpose of 
turning himself in so that he would be placed in maximum 
security custody. 
The Michigan Supreme Court in the case of People v. 
Luther, 232 N.W, 2d 184 held that duress is a well recognized 
defense and co.uld excuse a defendant from criminal responsibility 
in an escape case. In the buthe-r case the Supreme Court held 
that duress is a jury question that is successfully raised 
when evidence is presented from which a jury could conclude; 
(a) The threatening conduct was sufficient to 
create in the mind of a reasonable person the fear 
of death or serious bodily harm; 
(b) The conduct in fact caused such fear of death 
or serious bodily harm in the mind of the defendant; 
(c) The fear or duress was operating upon the mind 
of the defendant at the time o.f the alleged act; and 
(d) The defendant committed the act to avoid the 
threatened harm. 
The defendant in the Luther case testified that he had been 
confronted earlier in the day by six assailants who made 
homosexual demands on him, knocked him down and made threats 
with a knife. 
A defendant in a Kentucky case failed to specify 
the names of his attackers when he escaped claiming he was 
unable to pay a gambling debt, Pittman v .. Commonwealth, 512 
S,W. 2d 488 (Kentucky 1974). The defendantts testimony 
was that four prisoners confronted him and demanded the 
-7-
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money or homosexual acts. The court merely instructed the 
jury that if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Pittman 
escaped they should find him guilty. The Kentucky Supreme 
Court applied a standard of compulsion as: 
"The present imminent and impending danger of such 
a nature as to induce a well grounded apprehension 
of death or serious bodily harm if the escape is not 
made." 
The court in Pittman held that the jury instruction was 
prejudicial because relevant evidence proffered by the 
defendant was excluded from the jury's consideration. 
If the defense of compulsion is raised it is then 
the State's responsibility to convince the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the escape was not the product of 
duress. People v. Field, 184 N.W.2d 551 (Michigan 1970). 
It is the appellant's contention that he sufficiently 
raised the issue of compulsion that the jury should have 
been instructed on that issue. The effect of not giving the 
jury ins~ruction was tantamount to a directed verdict since 
there was no denying the fact that appellant left the prison. 
POINT---II 
CLOSING THE APPELLANT'S TRIAL BASED ON UNSUBSTANTIATED 
INFORMATION DENIED APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial has been 
guaranteed to State criminal defendant through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 264 
(1947). The relevant portion of the Sixth Amendment to the 
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United States Constitution provides, "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial . .. . . " Almost the same language 
is found in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah and in Utah Code Ann" §77-1-8 (1953 as amended). 
To determine if the acts of the trial court denied 
the appellant his right to a public trial the history and 
purpose of that protection should be considered. The history 
was succinctly described in the case of In re Oliver, supra. 
This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing 
a public trial to an accused has its roots in our 
English connnon law heritage. The exact date of its 
origin is obscure, but it likely evolved before 
settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the 
ancient institution of jury trial. In this country 
the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public 
trial first appeared in a state constitution in 
1776. Following the ratification in 1791 of the 
Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, which 
commands that "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial . . . " most of the original states and 
those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted 
similar constitutional provisions. Today almost 
without exception every state by constitution, 
statute, or judicial decision, requires that all 
criminal trials be open to the public. 
The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret 
trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious 
use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition, 
to the excesses of the English Court of Start Chamber, 
and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de 
cachet. All of these institutions obviously 
symbolized a menace to liberty. In the hands of 
despotic groups each of them had become an 
instrument for the suppression of political and 
religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the 
right of an accused to a fair trial. Whatever 
other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his 
trial be conducted in public may confer upon our 
society the guarantee has always been recognized 
-9-
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as a safeguard against any attempt to employ 
our courts as instruments of prosecution. 
The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject 
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public 
opinion is an effective restraint on possible 
abuse of judicial power. [footnotes omitted] 
333 U.S. 264, 266-270 
The purposes o·f the right to a public trial were 
·described in the various opinions in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 
532 (1965). In that case the court held that the public 
trial guarantee could not be claimed by the media as a 
justification for televising and broadcasting a criminal 
trial. Mr. Justice Clark, the author of the plurality 
opinion, stated that: 
. . . it is a "public trial" that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees to the "accused". The 
purpose of the requirement of a public trial 
was to guarantee that the accused would 
be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condenmed. 
History has proven that secret tribunals were 
effective instruments of oppression. 381 U~S. 
532, 538-539. 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren in a concurring opinion quoted 
In re Oliver, supra, then enumerated some other purposes of 
the right to a public trial: 
. . . the public trial provision of the Sixth 
Amendment is a "guarantee to an accused" designed 
to "safeguard against any attempt to employ our 
courts as instruments of persecution." Clearly, 
the openness of the proceedings provides other 
benefits as well: it arguably improves the 
quality of testimony, it may induce unknown 
witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony 
it may move all trial participants to perform 
their duties conscientiously, and it gives the 
public the opportunity to observe the courts in 
the performance of their duties and to determine 
whether they are performing adequately. 
[footnote omitted] 381 U.S. 532,582 
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Similarly, Mr .. Justice Harlan relied on In re Oliver, supra, 
and stated in his concurring opinion, 
The ''public trial u guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment which reflects a concept fundamental 
to the administration of justice in this 
country, [citation omitted] certainly does not 
require that television be admitted to the 
courtroom~ [citation omitted] Essentially, 
the public trial guarantee embodies a view 
of human nature, true as a general rule, that 
Judges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors will perform 
their respective functions more responsibly in an 
open court than in secret proceedings. [citation 
omitted] A fair trial is the objective and a 
"public trial" is an institutional safeguard for 
attaining it, 381 U.S. 532,588 
Due to the important nature of the purposes of a 
public trial and the interests which it protects, it is 
the subject of very few limitations. In cases decided by 
this court the limitations can be placed in two categories: 
the prevention of interference with orderly court procedures 
and the need to shelter certain members of the public from 
shocking or immoral facts. In s·tate v. Jordan, 5 7 Ut. 612, 
196 P.565 (1921) this court described such circumstances, 
Aside from the inherent power of every court, 
in rare instances, to exclude part of the public, 
as in such extreme areas where its presence waild 
interfere with the due and orderly procedure in the 
progress of the trial, or where the testimony 
is of such a character as to shock the sense of 
decency or tend to degrade the public morals, 
more especially those of the young, the 
exclusion of the public should be, and generally is, 
held to violative of the constitutional rights 
of the accused. 196 P.565, 567. 
-11-
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In that case this court reversed the appellant's conviction 
for carnal knowledge, because the courtroom had been closed 
when the prosecutrix testified. In the case at bar the only 
question is with respect to the interference with trial 
procedure. 
The cases from this court have not reached the 
question of the procedures that a trial court should employ 
to determine if it would be proper to close a courtroom. 
Recently, the Court of Appeals of New York dealt with this 
issue in People v .. J'ones. 47 N.Y.2d 409, 391 N.E. 2d 1335 
(N.Y. App., 1979). In that case the prosecutor moved to close 
the courtroom when an undercover agent began to testify. 
The prosecutor represented to the court that the witness was 
in fear for his life. The judge closed the courtroom without 
receiving any further information by way of testimony or 
colloquy. In doing so, the court stated that it would take 
notice of the nature and dangers of being an undercover agent 
in New York City. During the course of cross examination of 
the agent it was discovered that the agent was no longer working 
undercover and was, in fact, working as a uniformed patrolman. 
The court stated that when a trial judge is faced with a situation 
where a request that the courtroom be closed is made and the 
defendant has objected, the trial court should use its discretion 
in determining if such a request is meritorious. It was 
suggested that in some cases it may be enough merely to question 
counsel~ witnesses, or the spectators to reach a decision. 
The court went on to state: 
-1?-
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In other cases, the only truthworthy means of 
establishing grounds for excluding the public may 
very well be to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
[citation omitted] which, if the need is apparent, 
might be held behind closed doors [citation omitted]. 
In short, while there is no single rule to cover 
every case, no closing can be tolerated that is not 
preceded by an inquiry careful enough to assure 
the court that the defendant's right to a public 
trial is not being sacrificed for less than 
compelling reasons. 391 N.E. 2d 1335, 1339. 
Because of the lack of such an interest in that case the court 
affirmed the order of the appellate division reversing the 
conviction. 
In the case at bar, the courtroom was ordered to be 
closed and spectators were required to leave without any notice 
to the appellant or his counsel (T.244-245). No hearing was 
held nor were facts given for the record to support the court's 
action until the next recess when the jury was excused (T.258). 
At that time it was revealed by one of the guards present in 
the courtroom that he had received information via telephone 
from the Murray City Police, who had received information 
from a prison employee that there would be an escape attempt 
from the trial (T.259), Nothing was presented to establish 
the reliability of the information from the prison employee. 
There also is no indication in the record that any of the 
defendants had done anything during the course of the proceeding 
to indicate that there may be an escape attempt, nor was there 
any disturbance by the defendants during the proceedings. 
If an evidentiary hearing had been held there would be no 
exception to Rule 63 as required by Rule 66 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence to allow such hearsay within hearsay evidence 
-13-
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to be admitted. Likewise, the mere assertion that one has 
received a telephone call from a certain party lacks foundational 
requirements for admissibility, see generally, - State v. Merlar, 
94 Idaho 803, 498 P,2d 1276 (1972). 
Even if these proof problems could be overcome, the 
court could have used alternatives to prevent an escape or any 
other such courtroom disturbance other than closing the 
courtroom to spectators. For example, a guard could have 
been placed by the doors to prevent escape. or the doors could 
have been locked once the spectators were in the courtroom. 
If there was a reason to believe that some of the spectators 
would aid in such an escape attempt they could have been searched 
prior to entering the courtroom, In the alternative, any 
combination of these alternatives may have been used. 
Because there was no compelling reason given for 
the closing of the courtroom in this case, nor was sufficient 
inquiry made to satisfactorily establish such a compelling 
reason, nor were other viable alternatives explored, the 
appellant was denied the constitutional right to a public trial 
as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 12 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
POINT III 
THE SHOWING OF THE DENIAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL REQUIRES THE REVERSAL 
OF THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WITHOUT A SHOWING 
OF PREJUDICE. 
Since the appellant's right to a public trial has been 
denied, his conviction must be r iled 
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that when a defendant ts right to a public trial has been 
denied, prejudice need not be shown on appeal for the conviction 
to be reversed, State v .. Jordan, supra, State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 
177, 269 P. 480 (1928). In those cases, the Court did not 
elaborate on the reasons for this ruling, however, reasons 
given iri the case law support the necessity for such a rule. 
In P'eople v. Jelke, 308 N .. Y. 56, 123 N .. E. 2d 769 
(N.Y. App. 1954), the Court of Appeals of New York reversed 
a conviction for compulsory prostitution when the trial court 
closed the courtroom to all spectators but friends and relatives 
of the accused. The court held that since the defendant's 
right to a public trial had been denied he was entitled to 
have his conviction reversed without a showing of prejudice. 
The reason that the court gave was, 
To plaint that such a ruling will result 
in reversal of a conviction of one clearly 
proved guilty, it is sufficient to say that the 
decision herein far transcends the issue of 
[defendant's] guilt or the disposition of this 
particular case. As one court has expressed 
it (Peo~le v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 286, 50 N.W. 
995, 99 ), "It is for the protection of all 
persons accused of crime - the innocently 
accused, that they may not become the victim 
of an unjust prosecution, as well as the guilty, 
that they may be awarded a fair trial." 123 N.E. 2d 
769, 775. 
In People v. Jones, supra, this rule was upheld and 
the court gave some other reasons for not requiring an appellant 
to show prejudice when his right to a public trial has been 
denied. The reasons that the court gave are based on those 
very same reasons given for the public trial protection, 
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See generally, Point I, supra, It is a significant safeguard 
against unfair trials, likewise, it enhances the public's 
confidence in the judicial system. The court then 
stated, 
The harmless error rule is no way to guage the 
great, though intangible, societal loss that 
flows from the frustration of such a goal. 
The practical impossibility of demonstrating 
prejudice faces an accused as well. Conceptionally, 
a member of a public witnessing a trial may 
discover that he possesses material information 
which he will then volunteer to the parties. Or, 
the presence of the public may have a salutary 
influence in deterring a witness from perjuring 
himself in ways that would have been difficult 
for the defense to counteract. To require the 
defendant to undertake the well-nigh impossible 
task of proving prejudice would render the right 
to a public trial illusory and beyond appellate 
review on that basis. 391 N.E. 2d 1335, 1340-1341. 
For these reasons prejudice is implied when such a fundamental 
right has been violated. Consequently, due to the nature of 
the right to a public trial, and because the trial court's 
actions denied the appellant of his right to a public trial 
in this case his conviction must be reversed even though 
prejudice has not been shown, 
CONCLUSIONS 
The appellant is entitled to a new trial because the 
court failed to allow the defense of compulsion to be 
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considered by the jury and the court was closed to spectators 
contrary to the appellant's constitutional right to a public 
trial. 
DATED this __ day of January 1 1981._ 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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